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A ROLE FOR THE lOb-5 PRIVATE ACTION
After a record year in 1971 and a fast start in 1972, the outlook
for Liggett & Myers shareholders was optimistic. In the spring of
1972, however, information available only to the management of
Liggett & Myers indicated that the company's annual earnings
would decrease from the 1971 level.1 In July 1972, an officer of
the company leaked word of this downturn to a financial analyst at
Loeb Rhoades & Company. The analyst spoke to one of his cus-
tomers who without delay sold 1800 shares of Liggett & Myers stock.
2
These events arguably constitute a violation of current secu-
rities law, in particular section 10(b) 3 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act).4 Pursuing such a theory, a Liggett & Myers
stockholder instituted a class action asserting that a company in-
sider5 wrongfully tipped the Loeb Rhoades analyst to the detriment
of the plantiff class. The class consisted of investors who had pur-
chased Liggett & Myers stock without benefit of the information
on 1972 earnings.6
The significance of this fact pattern stems from the importance
of securities and securities markets to the American economy.7 The
3 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir. 1980).
21&1. 161.
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (general antifraud provision).
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1934
Act].
5 This comment adopts a definition of insiders that includes persons whose
special relationship to a company, which is often but not always an employment
relationship, makes them privy to information regarding the securities of that
company that is not generally available. Under this definition, a person may be
treated as an insider for the purposes of a lawsuit if he or she traded on the basis
of information provided by an insider. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(b) (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1978) [hereinafter cited as ALI CODE]. An insider found to
have tipped information, although not to have traded personally, also may be held
liable. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 165. Using Elkind as an example, potential defendants
include the Liggett & Myers officer (tipper) who leaked information and Loeb
Rhoades & Co. which traded on the basis of the information. Depending on the
circumstances, the company whose insiders are found to have violated their duties
may be held vicariously liable for the insiders' wrongs. See generally Elkind, 635
F.2d at 165-68. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980), reversing a criminal conviction under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5,
may limit further the definition of "insiders" for purposes of rule 10b-5 liability.
6 Elkind, 635 F.2d at 158.
7 A substantial percentage of United States citizens' wealth is invested in stock
securities. In 1972, the nearly $871 billion invested in corporate stock represented
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initial public offering of stock performs a vital function by inex-
pensively aggregating large amounts of investment capital for cor-
porate use." One major reason for investor participation in initial
offerings is that secondary markets in which the stock later can be
traded are available. 9 Secondary markets provide several benefits
that encourage continued capital formation. For example, they
enable investors to transfer freely their stock interests to other com-
panies promising greater potential returns and to convert their
investments to cash quickly.1 0 These markets, therefore, are a
crucial link in the capital formation process.
more than 40% of the non-real estate personal wealth in the United States. See
BunEru or Cmxsus, U.S. DE,'T or CoMMRMcE, STATIsTcAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UN= STATEs, 471 (101st ed. 1980).
8 For example, during 1979, new stock worth over $10.5 billion was offered
publicly for sale. Id. 546.
Capital invested in the corporation generally results in substantial growth in
the American economy. Under Keynesian economic analysis, an increase in
investment causes income and employment to expand. Moreover, increase in
investment has a "multiplier" effect on gross national product. P. SAM-EL5ON,
EcoNomcs 216-34 (11th ed. 1980).
9 The Supreme Court, for example, has described the significance of the national
securities markets:
Stock exchanges perform an important function in the economic life of
this country. They serve, first of all, as an indispensable mechanism
through which corporate securities can be bought and sold. To corporate
enterprise such a market mechanism is a fundamental element in facilitating
the successful marshaling of large aggregations of funds that would
otherwise be extremely difficult of access.
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 349 (1963).
1oOrganized security exchanges are said to provide important benefits to busi-
nesses in at least four ways.
1. Security exchanges facilitate the investment process by providing a
marketplace in which to conduct transactions efficiently and relatively
inexpensively. Investors are thus assured that they will have a place
in which to sell their securities, if they decide to do so. The increased
liquidity thus provided by the exchanges makes investors willing to
accept a lower rate of return on securities than they would otherwise
require. This means that exchanges lower the cost of capital to
businesses.
2. By providing a market, exchanges create an institution in which con-
tinuous transactions test the values of securities. The purchases and
sales of securities record judgments on the values and prospects of
companies and their securities. Companies whose prospects are
judged favorably by the investment community will have higher values,
thus facilitating new financing and growth.
3. Security prices are relatively more stable because of the operation of
the security exchanges. Organized markets improve liquidity by pro-
viding continuous markets which make for more frequent, but smaller,
price changes. In the absence of organized markets, price changes
would be less frequent but more violent.
4. The securities markets aid in the digestion of new security issues and
facilitate their successful flotation.
J. WESTON & E. BIuGHAM, MANAGmEAL FiNANCE 459-60 (6th ed. 1978).
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An attractive image of secondary markets provides an important
source of encouragement to potential investors." Apparent fairness
is partially responsible for maintaining this image. The image of
fairness, however, is tarnished whenever insiders misuse informa-
tion. A belief that insiders use unfair trading advantages dis-
courages trading by potential investors who seek to profit by using
only public information to predict future trends for particular enter-
prises. The affect will be to curtail the flow of investment funds
into the securities markets.' 2 Hence, trading by insiders on su-
perior knowledge obtained solely through their access to privileged
information is an abuse of the marketplace that must be controlled.
The insider trading abuse in Elkind occurred on a national
securities exchange. Available evidence suggests that such insider
trading violations are common and constitute a source of continuing
concern in the American financial community. 13
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has responded
to this problem, in part, by promulgating rule lOb-5.14  This broad
11 The stock exchanges clearly have a large stake in the stock market's
reputation. For the flow of private funds into the market to continue,
the stock market must not only be completely 'honest," but its reputation
must be above suspicion. The exchanges' institutional interest in their
public image, an interest shared by the securities industry in general, is
reflected in other areas as well. For example, the exchanges have acted
in the past to protect the public against loss resulting from the insolvency
of brokerage houses.
Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 720, 733
(citation omitted).
12The American community, consequently, will be deprived of the economic
benefits of this additional investment. See supra note 10.
Is See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1,
5-7 (1980). A recent insider trading scandal involving two Wall Street investment
banking firms received substantial press coverage. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1981,
§ D, at 6, col. 3; Phila. Inquirer, Mar. 8, 1981, § D, at 1, col. 6; Wall. St. J., Feb.
13, 1981, at 1, col. 6. In another example of insider trading, a partner at a New
York law firm profited from investments in several companies "involved in mergers
for which his firm was providing legal advice." See Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1981,
at 24, col. 1.
14Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
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rule prohibits fraud, deception, and material misrepresentation in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 15  The. SEC,
however, has not been the only party to enforce rule lOb-5. Despite
the absence of a clear legislative mandate,16 courts: have implied a
private 1Ob-5 cause of action, allowing investors to seek redress for
a wide range of securities fraud.17  These courts, however, in at-
tempting to deal with alleged fraud in vastly different fact situa-
tions,' have reached varying conclusions concerning the elements
necessary to prove a violation. 19 Similarly, courts have had sub-
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under authority granted by § 10(b) of the 1934
Act, which prohibits the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device . .. in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1976). For text of § 10(b), see infra note 29.
15 A. BRommrC & L. LowENFL-s, S-cumrs FPAUD .bi CommonmrEs FRAuD
§ 2.3, at 50 (1979).
16 See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text
17 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d
228 (2d Cir. 1974) (material information withheld in a transaction on a national
exchange); Mitchell-v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.) (mislead-
ing statement induced plaintiffs to sell stock), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).;
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.) (material information withheld in a
face-to-face trimsaction), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
18 A number of permutations are possible. For example, insider trading may
involve different degrees of misrepresentation or simple nondisclosure. An insider
may trade through a face-to-face transaction or on a national exchange.
29 The Supreme Court recently has attempted to clarify confused case law on
the necessary elements of a violation, and the lower courts have tried to follow
suit. For instance, 4anding to bring a private action depends on a prospective
plaintiff being a purchaser or a seller, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stofes,
421 U.S. 723 (1975). See infra text accompanying notes 67-71. Scienter is
required in 10b-5 private actions; mere negligence will not suffice, Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). A private action may be brought on the
basis of misrepresentation, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), or simple nondisclosure, Cady, Roberts
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). Misrepresentation or nondisclosure must be
with respect to a material fact, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
848-53 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Although
reliance appears as an element in some situations, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), apparently
"positive proof of reliance is not [always] a prerequisite -to recovery," Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). Causation is the final
and perhaps the least clearly defined element of a private 10b-5 action. In some
cases causation is assumed upon proof of materiality, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); in- other cases a causal
link between the defendant's violation and the plaintiff's. loss must be established,
Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-22 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1053 (1977).
These recognized elements of a 10b-5 violation, however, are not clearly
defined; the ambiguity may be traced, in pjar, to their judicial development. For
a discussion of their judicial development, see infra note 53.
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stantial difficulty fashioning appropriate remedies for established
violations.2 0 Rule 1Ob-5 litigation involving insider trading on
-national securities markets has been particularly troublesome and
has given rise to much commentary pointing out tensions in the
policies underlying these private actions. 21  The commentary also
has provided evidence, of severe enforcement difficulties that appear
to result from the complexities facing a plaintiff trying to prove a
1Ob-5 violation.22
- Courts have used the common law of fraud, which .forms
the basis of an analogous action arising from a face-to-face trans-
action, to develop the10b-5 private action. The intended result is
an action furthering two goals: deterrence and compensation. The
analogy to common law fraud, however, is imperfect. Individual
investors suffer no direct harm from insider trading; 23 therefore,
they should not be able to seek damages for insider trading viola-
tions. This Comment suggests a legislative variation of the 1Ob-5
private action that will further the goal of deterrence without com-
pensating investors not harmed by the trading violations.
Two problems are immediately apparent: how to encourage
,private actions if. compensation is abandoned and how to reduce the
complexity of pursuing such claims so that deterrence will in fact
result. This Comment proposes that private actions be encouraged
by awarding attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs. The difficulties
of proof faced by these plaintiffs can be reduced, and the likelihood
of success increased, by shifting the burden of proof from the plain-
tiff to the offending insider after the plaintiff has proved a prima
facie case. A modification of the American Law Institute's pro-
posed Federal Securities Code (ALI Code) is offered as a convenient
vehicle for implementing these suggestions.
To highlight the need for change, this Comment outlines the
tensions underlying the 1Ob-5 private action for insider trading on
20 See infra note 38.
2 1 See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 13; Hetherington, supra note 11; Jacobs, The
Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 65 GEo. L.J. 1093 (1977); Lowenfels,
Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum
Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors,
23 VA'D. L. REv. 547 (1970); Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider
Trading on Impersonal Exchanges, 74 CoLUv. L. REv. 299 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Damages to Uninformed Traders]; Comment, Fashioning a Lid for Pan-
dora's Box: A Legitimate Role for Rule 10b-5 in Private Actions Against Insider
Trading on a National Stock Exchange, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 404 (1969) [herein-
after cited as Pandoras Box].
22 See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 13, at 1-2, 18-24. For a discussion of these
problems of proof, see infra note 53 and accompanying text.
2 3 See infra note 36.
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a national exchange. 24 Part I demonstrates that, despite serious
problems of efficiency and uncertain justification, the private action
is an important deterrent mechanism and should not be abandoned;
Part II assesses several methods of encouraging the private action
to help curb objectionable tradingas paying particular attention to
the ALI Code. Finally, part III proposes a modification of the
ALI Code that shifts the-burden of proof and awards attorneys'
fees to successful plaintiffs; The goal is to encourage use of the
1Ob-5 private action as an efficient deterrent to objectionable in-
sider trading.
I. 1Ob-5 PRIVATE AmTONS: THEIR PROtLEMS AND THEIR VALUE
Although neither the 'language nor the legislative history of
the 1934 Act evinces a clear intent to .create. a lOb-5 action for
insider trading,2 6 Congress's general desire to promote fair dealing
is manifest.27  The legislators recognized the importance of the
securities markets to the American financial system and there-
fore sought to prevent a recurrence of the loss of public confidence
in the markets that had resulted from the Great Depression.28
24 This Comment analyzes insider trading on a national exchange on the basis
of nondisclosed, material information-that is, nondisclosed information about a
company upon which "a reasonable investor might or would rely in making a
decision to buy or sell. See generally Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848-49.
25 Some of these proposals also attempt to encourage private actions ifi order
to compensate individual investors. This Comment rejects -any such goal. See
infra note 36 and accompanying text.
21 Some support does exist, however, to suggest that Congress did intend to
prohibit insider trading:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before
the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by
directors and officers of corporations who used their positions of trust and
the confidential information which came to them in such positions, to aid
them in their market activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse was
the unserpulous employment of inside information by laige stockholders
who, while not directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the
destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire and'profit by infor-
mation not available to others.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934), reprinted in 5 LzxsLArrn
HISTORY OF THE SEcuBRs ACT OF 1933 AND Szcunrr-es EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934
Item 21 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahlar compilers, 1973) [hereinafter cited as
LECSLrAI- HISTORY]. But see Dooley, supra note 13, at 56 n.235 (arguing that
such statements "actually were summaries of several market pools organized by
insiders in which inside information in the modem sense played little or no role").
Congress's acquies'cence to over thirty years of court-enforded private actions,
including actions for insider trading violations, suggests that Dooley's argument is
moot. See infra note 31.
2T See, e.g., Damages to Uninformed Traders, supra note 21, at 300.
2sSee H.R. RP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, 13-14 (1934), reprinted
in 5 EcISLATIVE MIsToRY, supra note 26, Item 18.
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Section 10(b) of the 1934-Act 29 is intended to prohibit deceptive
and manipulative practices that conflict with the public interest or
'cause harm to investors. -Insider trading certainly comes within
this range of proscribed activities. 30
The judicially implied private 10b-5 action3 ' provides an im-
portant supplement to other methods of curbing insiders' misuse of
their informational advantages.a2 The private action has been
justified on the grounds that it compensates plaintiffs supposedly
injured by the insiders' trading activities.3 3 In addition, to the ex-
tent that insiders seek to avoid the payment of damage claims, the
private action is a deterrent. Numerous commentators, however,
have criticized the goal of compensation.3 4  Because in many cir-
29 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
3 0 In the spirit of the New Deal .. . Congress turned on [insider trading]
activity as wrongful. Inside trading was considered to weaken confidence
in the market and the capitalistic structure that the stock exchange .epre-
sented. Moreover, it allowed those fortunate enough to be on the "inside"
to profit at the expense of the public. In the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Congress tried to deal with the problem, inter alia, by inclusion of
section 10, and the SEC eventually interpreted that section through rule
10b-5.
Damages to Uninformed Traders, supra note 21, at 299-300 (citations omitted).
See generally H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 5 LEGis-
LAriv HIsTORy, supra note 26, Item 18; Pandords Box, supra note 21, at 405.
31A private cause of action under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 was first implied in
Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme
Court did not face this question until twenty-five years later when it affirmed the
long line of precedent upholding the implied § 10 action. Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
32 Insider trading can be curbed in a number of fashions. Section 16(b) of
the 1934 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), requires insiders to disgorge
trading profits made under specified circumstances. Courts have allowed the SEC
to seek restitution in insider trading cases, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); in some state
courts, a shareholder can bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation to
attack insider trading, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d
910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
33 See generally Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 168-73 (2d
Cir. 1980); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
241-42 (2d Cir. 1974).
34 See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 13, at 31-33; Note, Limiting the Plaintiff
Class: Rule 10b-5 and the Federal Securities Code, 72 MicH. L. REv. 1398, 1424-
26 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Limiting the Plaintiff Class]; Pandora's Box, supra
note 21, at 409-10.
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.cumstances a corporation lawfully may withhold from the public 3
the information on which trading insiders rely, traders on the op-
posite sides of such transactions are not. misled by the insider's
trading. Rather, they are misled by the admittedly lawful non-
disclosure;36 Thus, "compensation" for plaintiffs is a windfall.
The difficulties that arise in defining the plaintiff class 37 and
in measuring the appropriate compensation for those who have
been injured 38 illustrate the problem. For example, assume an
35 See Pandoras Box, supra note 21, at 405.
S6 Dooley, supra note 13, at 33. Commentators point out that although the
insider violates the securities laws by trading on the basis of material, nondisclosed
information, the trading, not the concealing of information, makes their conduct
unlawful. Inside information may be, and often is, concealed lawfully for a valid
corporate purpose. Id. 32. Usually, plaintiffs are not even aware of insider trading.
Indeed, the volume traded by insiders is frequently too small to affect the stock
price. Hetherington, supra note 10, at 20. Plaintiffs, therefore, would have traded
and incurred their market losses regardless of the abusing insider's trading. The
losses plaintiffs incur when the inside information is disclosed-disclosure being a
corporate decision made without regard to or knowledgi of insider trading-are
caused by the disclosure itself, not by insider trading. See Pandora's Box, supra
note 21, at 410, 413-14.
Only in the infrequent case when the volume of insider trading is so great
that it has a perceptible effect on the market price of a security could outsiders
argue that an insider's actions influenced their investment decisions. Investors then
might argue that they traded to their detriment because of insider-induced price
fluctuations. If the stock price were to change, however, it would move in the
"correct" direction, reducing the likelihood that traders might rely on the change
to their detriment. Dooley, supra note 13, at 35-36. The Sixth Circuit, adopting
this line of reasoning, has held that liability cannot arise in the absence of -a causal
connection between the defendant's activities and the plaintiffs' losses. Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
By that reasoning, only those investors who traded on the premise of a false price
rise conceivably could suffer any injui--a small class indeed. See Hetherington,
supra note 11, at 725.
A further element may decrease the likelihood of even this direct harm to
investors. If, as the evidence suggests, insider trading violations are commonplace,
see Dooley, supra note 13, at 5-7, the disadvantages imposed on outside investors
by such trading probably are reflected already in a general decrease in price levels
on national exchanges. Id. 40-41. Because investors cannot expect to know when
insider trading may put them at a direct disadvantage, they are willing to pay
less for each share in all transactions; the price differential represents the fear of
being "cheated" by insider trading.
37 See generally Limiting the Plaintiff Class, supra note 34. The defendants
are not so difficult to identify: they all will be insiders who traded on nondisclosed.
information, insiders who tipped others, and tippees. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d at 848. See generally id. 847-57.
3 8 Compare Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1973) (equitable
rescission of contract allowed) with Chasins v. Smith Barney & Co., 438 F.2d
1167 (2d Cir. 1970) (recovery measured by the difference between the price a
defrauded buyer paid for a security and the lowest fair market value of the security
within a reasonable time after he should have discovered the fraud) and Myzel
v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 744-45 (8th Cir. 1967) (plaintiff's damages measured
by out-of-pocket loss), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) and Janigan v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.) (defendant's windfall profits awarded to plaintiff to
avoid unjust enrichment), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965) and SEC v. Shapiro,
349 F. Supp. 46, 55-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (plaintiffs' recovery measured by defen-
dants' gains), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
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insider with knowledge of nonpublic information trades a small
number of shares of stock. In a transaction on a national exchange,
no single individual's position corresponds to that of the injured
party in a fraudulent face-to-face transaction. If injury to any
individual is assumed, then equal injury is suffered by all who
traded to their detriment in the particular class of stock between
the time of the insider's unlawful trading and the time the non-
disclosed information became generally available to the public39
As this Comment will demonstrate, 40 attempts to limit the plaintiff
class to a smaller group are artificial and arbitrary and generally
cannot be justified by practical considerations. Such identification
of litigants is likely to result in a huge class of plaintiffs and only a
small number of defendants. 41 Using the traditional "out of pocket"
measure of damages, 42 as some courts have,4 3 the plaintiffs' per-share
losses would be equivalent to the defendants' ill-gotten per-share
39 For a discussion of attempts to limit the plaintiff class, -see infra text accom-
panying notes 66-71. See generally Limiting the Plaintiff Class, supra note 34;
Pandoras Box, supra note 21, at 406-09.
The growth of the class and of the injury are cut off when the investor dis-
covered, or reasonably should have discovered, the fraud. After this time, the
investor could have avoided additional damage by making purchases or sales, de-
pending on his or her position. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281,
1306 n.27 (2d Cir. 1973) (case involving proxy regulations).
4oSee infta text accompanying notes 66-71.
41 See generally Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 849.
42 One theory suggests that the defendant's gains provide a fairer measure of
damages than the plaintiff's losses. This restitution theory allows a plaintiff to
recover the amount by which a defendant benefited at the plaintiff's expense and
seeks to avoid unjust enrichment. For a discussion of this remedy and its applica-
tion to the insider -situation, see Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud
Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 D=rz L.J. 641; Pandora's Box, supra note 21,
at 412-14.
4 3 See Huddleston v. Herman & Maclean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981);
Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977) (normal
measure); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975) (ordinary
standard); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1974) (tradi-
tionally the only measure'in fraud actions); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372,
1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (theoretically preferred); Jacobs, supra note 21, at 1099.
This measure of damages is framed as:
the difference between the contract price, or the price paid, and the real
or actual value at the date of sale, together with such outlays as are
attributable to the defendant's conduct. Or in other words, the difference
between the amount parted with and the value of the thing received.
Estate Counseling Serv. Inc.. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court approved this measure in
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154-55 (1972). The Sixth
Circuit also has recognized the out-of-pocket measure as the "traditional measure."
Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
830 (1974).
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gains.44 If a small group of defendants is held liable for the losses
of all possible plaintiffs, the potential liability is massive.45 Al-
though placing a limit on the total damages numerous plaintiffs
could recover 46 would avoid the arbitrary limitation on the plain-
tiff class and the assessment of "Draconian damages," 47 it would
mean abandoning a rigorous goal of compensation.. The evident
strain results because the goal of compensation rests on a tenuous
theoretical foundation.
The justifications for allowing plaintiffs to recover damages,
therefore, are that insider trading compromises market integrity
and results in an indirect harm to investors-48 and that such re-
coveries may deter future wrongdoing. 49 Eliminating or limiting
the possible recovery, however, removes the incentive to bring a
private action. This, in turn, would have a crippling impact on
any deterrence such suits provide.50
The private lOb-5 action faces another more serious problem.
Empirical evidence of enforcement difficulties 51 suggests that the
44The fact situation in Elkind raises the question how to measure the value,
at the time of the transaction, of the stock that the plaintiffs purchased. One method
of determining value is suggested by Harris v. American Investment Co., 523 F.2d.
220, 226-27 (8th Cir. -1975), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1054 (1976). Under this
method, value is determined by reference to the market price after the misrepre-
sentation is discovered, or, presumably, after the nondisclosed information becomes
generally available to the public. The assumption is that if no misrepresentation or
nondisclosure bad occurred, the price at the time of the transaction would have been
approximately the same as this later value. The reasoning is that the price at the
time of the transaction was distorted because supply and demand were at a false
equilibrium due to a lack of information or to misinformation. See generally'
Pandords Box, supra note 21, at 405. But see Elkind, 635 F.2d at 170-73.
45 Courts frequently have characterized the possible damages as 'Draconian."
See, e.g., Elkind, 635 F.2d at 170; Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 242 (2d Cir. 1974).
The Elkind case demonstrates this dilemma well. In Elkind, the defendants
avoided losses of approximately $17-20 per share of stock that they traded. 635
F.2d at 162. Having traded 1800 shares, their 'total "profit" was approximately
$30,000-$36,000. The label "Draconian" appears apt because the district court
awarded damages of $740,000 and pre-judgment interest of $300,000. Id.
41G See, for example, the proposal to limit the plaintiff's damages to a pro rata
portion of the defendants' gains. Under this proposal, a plaintiff would receive a
percentage of the approximately $36,000 that the defendants gained. The per-
centage would be based on the total shares bought by the plaintiff, divided by the
total bought during the relevant time period. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 21, at
1131 n.214; Damages to Uninformed Traders, supra note 21, at 316.
47 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
4 8 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
49 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text See generally Pandoras Box,
supra note 21, at 410-12.
5oDooley, supra note 13, at 23. This Comment's proposal suggests a solution
to the problem. See infra text accompanying notes 97-132.
61 This evidence is reviewed exhaustively by Dooley, supra note 13, at 82-88.
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deterrent value of private actions is minimal. Because the private
action has been judicially implied, enforcement has been uneven
and unpredictable 2  The plaintiff, moreover, faces the complex
and expensive - task of proving the various elements of a 1 Ob-5
action.53  Problems of proof are the second major stumbling block
for the 1Ob-5 private action.
62 Id. passim.
53These problems of proof have three facets. First, the law is not clear con-
cerning the elements that a plaintiff must prove in order to sustain a 10b-5 claim.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text. A second, and perhaps more serious,
problem is the uncertain definition of even those elements of an action that com-
monly must be proved. This uncertainty is traceable to the development of the
private 10b-5 action. The first case to imply a private action used a tort law
analysis. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
The elements necessary to establish a violation appear to have been those of
common law fraud: intentional misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact,
upon which the plaintiff relied in a reasonably forseeable manner, proximately re-
sulting in injury to the plaintiff. See also Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Lee, 310 F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1962).
Although common law fraud comfortably could accommodate a private 10b-5
action in circumstances such as those presented by Kardon, the private action was
not so limited. Courts, while operating under the rubric of common law fraud,
have had to strain its necessary elements in order to bring a wider variety of
trading violations within the reach of the 1Ob-5 private action. See A. BROMBERG
& L. LowENr Ls, supra note 15, § 1.1, at 5 (1979) ("The courts on the whole
have applied [rule 10b-5] generously, on the one hand, broadening the meaning of
fraud, and on the other, extending-it to more kinds of transactions and persons.").
The greatest problems result from the extension of common law fraud analysis, used
in face-to-face transactions, to 10b-5 actions for trades carried, out on a national
exchange. Such an. extension necessitates relaxing the strict common law require-
ments of reliance and causation. Because transactions on a national exchange are
anonymous, a plaintiff does not rely, in the usual sense, on the defendants' actions;
these actions, therefore, do not actually cause the plaintiff's loss. See supra notes
35-36 and accompanying text.
The third and most fatal problem of proof is the practical difficulty of proving
elements of the 10b-5 action.
[Ilt's very difficult to prove an insider trading case. It is one of the most
difficult cases to prove. A guy can give 100 different reasons why he
traded-and none of them will be that he had inside information. You
have to accept the statements that are made under oath, if you don't have
any other evidence.
412 SEc. BRE. & L. RBP. (BNA) A-6 (1977) (SEC regulator's comments). Rarely,
however, will there be "any other evidence." In the usual case in which the
defendant is a tippee, such as an investment banker, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant possessed and used inside, nondisclosed information. Unfortunately,
the tipper frequently will not testify that he or she tipped the defendant--otherwise
risking herself to liability-and the defendant, as noted, is hardly going to testify
against herself. Thus, potential plaintiffs frequently are faced with a case in
which "they know the defendant has traded on inside information, but have no way
of proving it." Interview with the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, former Regional Adminis-
trator, Securities andExchange Commission, and former Assistant Chief of the
Criminal Division of the United States Attorney's Office in New York City (Oct. 29,
1981). See also Dooley, supra note 13, at 19 (footnote omitted):
Moreover, most violations will never even be detected .... [Sleveral
clues more or less simultaneously [must be noticed]. First, a material
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These quandaries have prompted numerous proposals to change
the present system of 10b-5 enforcement. The proposals generally
fall into two categories. Some writers suggest abandoning private
actions. Other commentators work within the confines of the pri-
vate action, attempting to make it a viable enforcement tool. To
determine whether any of these writers adequately address the two
major problems of private actions-deterrence of defendants with-
out compensation for plaintiffs and complex problems of proof-
this Comment examines several of their proposals.
II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO lOb-5's DEFICIENCIES
A. Abandon the Private Action Entirely
1. The Proposals for Abandonment
A few commentators have concluded that private 1Ob-5 actions
are inappropriate methods of fulfilling the congressional aims em-
bodied in section 10(b).54 Discarding in part or altogether the
private action for insider trading violations, they generally call for
increased enforcement by the SEC. For example, one proposal
suggests that the SEC use its powers to obtain disgorgement of in-
sider profits when the expense and complexity of maintaining a
private action are prohibitive in relation to the possible award.55
People who would have been members of the plaintiff class would
be allowed a pro rata recovery from the SEC 56 A similar alter-
native envisions empowering the SEC to force disgorgement, pos-
sibly of a multiple of the insider's profits. The proceeds of these
actions, however, would not be awarded to private parties; rather,
they would be fed back into the SEC for further enforcement.51
event must occur. Absent such an occurrence, increases in volume or
substantial changes in the reported holdings of insiders will be disregarded
as random market fluctuations. Even if the event occurs, if reporting
insiders can delay the announcement of favorable news until several
months after they have purchased shares, no one is likely to make the
connection between their purchases and the supposedly "new" develop-
ment. Because most potential violators are not subject to reporting re-
quirements, the only clue that an insider has traded is an increase in
trading volume-a trace easily covered over by making small trades at
discreet intervals.
54 See, e.g., Ellsworth, supra note 41, at 648-50, 662-63; Jacobs, supra note 21.
55 Ellsworth, supra note 41, at 644-45. This proposal was originally suggested
in 3 L. Loss, Srcunmu-s REULA-nox 1828-29 (2d ed. 1961).
6 Jacobs, supra note 21, at 1131 n.214; Damages to Uninformed Traders,
supra note 21, at 316.
57 jacobs, supra note 21, at 1131 n.214. In addition, one writer has suggested
abandoning 10b-5 actions in cases of insider trading in favor of a complete legis-
lative reconsideration. Dooley, supra note 13, at 68-69.
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2. The Deficiencies of the Proposals to Abandon
the Private Action
These proposals address some of the objections to the lOb-5
private action. 8 The solution that funnels disgorged profits back
to the SEC to fund further enforcement appears to be the most
promising.5 9 The SEC's funded enforcement efforts would provide
deterrence, yet avoid compensating unharmed investors. The
burden and complexities of proof, furthermore, would seem to be
eased somewhat by the SEC's special pre-action discovery powers.6 O
This proposal, nonetheless, suffers from several shortcomings.
The bulk of the problems of proof would remain. Although the
SEC's pre-action discovery power would screen out the most frivo-
lous or hard to prove claims, providing somewhat more efficient
deterrence than private actions, evidence of the ineffectiveness of
present SEC efforts suggests that the agency actually can do only
marginally better than private plaintiffs."' In fact, the fear of a
private action may be a more effective deterrent in a variety of
difficult or close cases if it is perceived that the SEC will not prose-
cute.62  Moreover, the proposal assumes that the proceeds of SEC
GsThe two major problems with the private action are unjustified compensa-
tion for unharmed individual investors, see supra notes 33-47 and accompanying
text, and the difficulty in proving a 10b-5 claim. See supra notes 51-53 and
accompanying text.
59 The first proposal, which calls for SEC displacement of the private action
in complex and expensive cases, contemplates the SEC serving as a private collec-
tion agency for those who otherwise would be plaintiffs. Ellsworth, supra note 41,
at 644. The proposal does not address the obvious drain on SEC resources that
would result from such a duty. Id. 651; see also Dooley, supra note 13, at 18
("The inherent complexity of insider trading litigation would require the SEC to
commit scarce enforcement personnel for protracted periods of time if the defendant
were prepared to resist vigorously."). The most fatal criticism, however, is that
the proposal does not address either of the major problems with the private action.
Unharmed investors are still compensated, and the problems of proof facing the
SEC are only slightly less difficult than those facing a private plaintiff. See infra
notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
60 Prior to the commencement of a suit, the SEC can obtain a subpoena, for
instance, to compel testimony or the production of documents. See 1934 Act,
§ 21(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1976).
61 Many of the problems facing the SEC are no less troublesome than they
are for a private plaintiff. Unlike private parties, the SEC does not have to show
scienter; all of the other elements of the action, however, with all of their defini-
tional uncertainty, remain to be proven. See the discussion of the complicated
development of the elements of a 10b-5 claim, supra note 53. Practical difficulties
also remain. For example, the SEC also will have problems proving that a third
party received a tip. See supra note 53.
62Because of its limited resources, the SEC may choose to prosecute only a
narrow range of cases.
[C]ases in which the facts suggesting liability are clearer or in which the
defendant has less at stake have a comparative cost advantage for the
SEC. In short, budgetary considerations predict that the Commission
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disgorgement actions would be sufficient to fund additional SEC
enforcement. 83 This is not self-evident.
In addition, the private action provides important supple-
mental benefits that SEC enforcement cannot provide. For instance,
the private action affords investors the perception, if not the reality,
of having meaningful recourse to the courts to redress the insiders'
misuse of their informational advantages. In a system in which
appearances can influence the capital formation process," this ele-
ment should not be minimized.5
Private actions, therefore, should not be abandoned; instead,
they should be modified to overcome their practical and theoretical
deficiencies. The proposals that have preserved the basic frame-
work of the private lOb-5 action generally have fallen into two
categories: those that limit the plaintiff class and those that limit
damages.
B. Modifying the Present Private Action System
1. Limiting the Plaintiff Class
One method of dealing with the ineffectiveness of the private
1Ob-5 action leaves the structure of the action intact, focusing in-
stead on limiting the plaintiff class. This line of reasoning ad-
dresses the "Draconian damages" problem, which results when a
would tend to select for enforcement those cases in which the defendant
is likely to settle before trial or extensive pretrial proceedings. These
criteria result in a very narrow range of selection that excludes the bulk
of possible insider trading cases. It follows that most violations are never
subjected to enforcement action.
Dooley, supra note 13, at 19 (footnotes omitted). After discussing the tortuous
process of determining whether a violation of § 10(b) has occurred, Dooley con-
cludes that [elven a large agency devoted exclusively to policing insider trading
would be overwhelmed by such detective requirements, and the task of investigating
most apparent violations-let alone uncovering concealed ones-is clearly beyond
the capacity of the Commission." Id. 19-20.
63 See generally Damages to Uniformed Traders, supra note 21, at 316.
64 See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
65 Furthermore, the corporation may be harmed when insiders trade its securi-
ties illegally. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969); Pandords Box, supra note 21, at 413-14. But see Jacobs,
supra note 21, at 1136-37. If such activities become publicly known, the corporate
reputation may well suffer in the eyes of the investing public. See, e.g., SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1005 (1971); Diamond, 24 N.Y.2d at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d
at 82; see also Ellsworth, supra note 41, at 653:
[T]he court of appeals [in Texas Gulf Sulphur] justified the payments as
compensatory rather than punitive on the ground that the Texas Gulf
Sulphur Company itself may have suffered harm to its corporate goodwill
and the public's regard for its securities as a result of insiders abusing
their corporate positions.
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large plaintiff class sues a small number of defendants who then are
subjected to liability far in excess of their gain.66 The emphasis
of this method, however, is misplaced. It treats the effects of an
improperly formulated private action rather than its fundamental
shortcomings: unwarranted compensation and problems of proof.
Moreover, it fails to encourage the commencement of such suits
when there is little or no compensation forthcoming to even the
successful plaintiff.
The most justifiable limit on the plaintiff class is enunciated
in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.67 In Blue Chip Stamps,
the Supreme Court held that a person who is neither a purchaser
nor a seller of the securities in question may not maintain a private
action for damages under rule l0b-5.6 s The Court based its reason-
ing on legislative history, precedent, and policy. 9 It seemed most
concerned, however, with the possible extension of implied lia-
bilities under 1Ob-5 and the likelihood that spurious claims would
result if the plaintiff class were not limited at least to this extent.70
The Court was troubled by the possibility that people entirely un-
related to a transaction involving insiders could claim that they
would have traded in the particular security if only they had been
privy to the nondisclosed information.
66 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
67421 U.S. 723 (1975). Several other limits on the plaintiff class may be
disposed of quickly. A number of writers mention privity as a dividing line: only
those investors who actually traded with the defendant could sue. See, e.g.,
Jacobs, supra note 21, at 1134; Damages to Uninformed Traders, supra note 21,
at 311-13; Limiting the Plaintiff Class, supra note 34, at 1407. Most quickly
dismiss the idea. See, e.g., Damages to Uninformed Traders, supra note 21, at
312. But see Jacobs, supra note 21, at 1137.
Under the privity notion, a potential plaintiff would have to examine brokers'
records to discover how orders to buy and sell were matched. Damages to Un-
informed Traders, supra note 21, at 312. Those whose buy orders matched an
insider's sell orders would have a cause of action. The cost to obtain such in-
formation would be substantial, and most potential plaintiffs would find that their
orders did not match the insider's. Pandor's Box, supra note 21, at 406. Many
investors, therefore, probably would not pursue their claims. Such difficulties high-
light the errors in importing the logic of face-to-face transactions into faceless
situations. See supra note 53.
The suggestion in Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 326 (6th Cir. 1976)
(Celebrezze, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977), that the plaintiff
class be limited to those who traded contemporaneously with the insider, is similarly
untenable. Although this theory establishes a middle ground between the privity
notion and a larger class, the line is drawn primarily for convenience and is
difficult to justify if one assumes injury to any plaintiffs. Attempts to define
"contemporaneous," which could refer to the same day or the same hour, illustrate
the arbitrariness of this possible limit.
68 Blue.Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 749.
69 Id. 732,740.
70 Id. 740.
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The Court's analysis, however, is questionable. No reason
exists to think that a person who refrains from selling stock because
of a lack of information is injured any less than one who actually
purchases stock.7' In both situations the outsider would have
been in a different position had he or she had access to the
withheld information. The purchaser's claim is merely supported
by a more obvious change in position. Attempts to divide the
plaintiff class into more manageable groups, therefore, are mis-
guided because they result in arbitrary line drawing.
2. Limiting Damages
An alternative method of modifying the private action is to
limit the total damages awarded. Proposals based on this method,
however, like those that would limit the plaintiff class, fail to ad-
dress the problems of proof. In addition, although they recognize
the unfairness of huge damage awards, they nonetheless retain a
notion that plaintiffs should be compensated to some degree. 72
Not all of the damage formulations, however, are unhelpful.
For example, one damage remedy-restitution-has a more logical
foundation than others. A restitution remedy forces the defendant
to give up his or her ill-gotten gains. Its premise is the notion that
rather than "let the fraudulent party keep [his profits] . . .. it is
simple equity that a wrongdoer should disgorge his fraudulent en-
richment." 73 The SEC has forced disgorgement of ill-gotten profits
with greater frequency over the years.74 The remedy, however,
appears to have been employed sparingly in insider trading cases
of this kind.75
The ALI Code provides an example how to structure this
alternative remedy within the framework of the 1Ob-5 private
action.78 The ALI Code, therefore, bears a close examination be-
fore this Comment returns in part III to the role of restitution in
the development of a new proposal.
71 Lovenfels, supra note 21, at 895.
72 See, e.g., ALI CODE, supra note 5, § 1711(1).
73 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 879
(1965) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court cited Janigan with approval in
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) ("where the
defendant received more than the [plaintiff-seller's] actual loss . .. damages are
the amount of the defendant's profit."). See generally Jacobs, supra note 21, at
1137; Damages to Uninformed Traders, supra note 21, at 313-15.
74 See Ellsworth, supra note 41, at 642.
7 5 See, e.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp. 46, 55-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aftd,
494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally Dooley, supra note 13, at 18-24.
76 ALI CoDE, supra note 5, § 1708.
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C. The ALl's Proposed Federal Securities Code
Section 1703 of the ALI Code defines who may be a plaintiff.
77
When "the transaction is effected in a manner which would make
the matching of buyers and sellers substantially fortuitous," 78 such
as a trade on an impersonal exchange, the class is composed of
those people who bought or sold "between (1) the day when the
defendant first unlawfully sells or buys and (2) the day when all
material facts . . .become generally available." 79. The plaintiffs'
damages are measured by the amount they paid less the value of
the security at the time when the information became generally
available.80 The total recovery, however, is limited to the amount
of the defendant's profits on the purchase or sale of the securities
in question."' If the claims of all the plaintiffs exceed the amount
of the defendant's liability, the total recovery must be prorated
among the plaintiffs relative to their holdings.82
The ALI Code, however, has not adopted a rigid position
concerning the civil liability that results from insider trading. Al-
though its framers and various commentators state that the ALI
Code makes its greatest contribution to securities law by bringing
a degree of order to the area of 1Ob-5 civil liability, 3 further de-
velopment in the area clearly was contemplated. The SEC, for
77 The possible defendants, labeled "insiders," are defined in the ALI CODE,
supra note 5, § 1603, as company directors, officers, others who are related to the
company and might have access to inside information, and those commonly called
"tippees," who may have learned their information from insiders. Id. § 1603(b).
Section 1603 also describes the insider's duty to disclose inside information or to
refrain from trading.
78 Id. § 1703(b).
79 Id.
80 Id. § 1708(b).
slId. § 1708(b)(3).
82Id. § 1711(j). This scheme would lead to the following result in Elkind v.
Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). Having violated his duty to
disclose or refrain from trading, the Loeb Rhoades analyst would be liable to the
entire class of people who purchased stock of the same class between the time of
the analyst's trade and the time when the information of Liggett's downturn became
generally available. If the stock had decreased in value $17 per share over that
period, then the plaintiffs could recover $17 for every share purchased. Because
there are more plaintiffs than defendants, however, and because the volume of their
purchases is large, their recovery would be limited to the defendant's total loss
avoidance, also $17 per share or a total of $30,600 for 1,800 shares. This amount
would be prorated among the plaintiffs according to their holdings.
83 Loss, Keynote Address: The Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MrA2 L. REV.
1431, 1445 (1979); Throop, The Proposed Federal Securities Code: A Response to
Its Critics, 33 U. Mrimi L. lv. 1597, 1609 (1979); Comment, The Codification
of Rule 10(b)-5 Private Actions in the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U.
Mi.MI L. REv. 1615, 1647-48 (1979).
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example, is empowered to define through rulemaking the "condi-
tions and restrictions" of the ALI Code's prohibitions. s'4 So long
as they are not inconsistent with the ALI Code or with SEC rules,
the courts may imply private rights of action in securities cases.15
When it appears "on consideration of such factors as the plaintiff's
loss, the defendant's profit, and the deterrent effect of the particular
type of liability" that a different measure of damages "would plainly
be more appropriate," the courts may employ one.8
Some significant variations in remedy, however, may be found
without venturing beyond the ALI Code. Should the court find
bad faith in pursuit of or in defense to a claim, it may award at-
torneys' fees to the wronged party.8 7 If the court finds that pro-
ration of damages is not warranted because of the expense of
proration and the small size of the award that would result, it may
award the damages to the issuer 88s or to the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation. 9
The ALI Code contains a number of improvements on the
existing private action enforcement systems. It takes a significant
step toward making the punishment fit the crime by limiting a
defendant's liability to his or her profit from insider trading. Con-
sequently, there is no need to resort to arbitrary methods of limit-
ing the plaintiff class. The ALI Code also expressly recognizes
the difference between face-to-face transactions and transactions on
national exchanges. Although it seems to incorporate the Blue
Chip Stamps limitation of claimants to buyers and sellers,90 one
commentator has suggested that courts might recognize broader
classes of plaintiffs under section 1722(a), which "leaves the 'outer
frontiers' of rule lOb-5 to judicial development." 9t The upper
limit on damages negates the harshness to defendants that other-
wise might result from recognizing a larger plaintiff class.
84 ALI Co)E, supra note 5, § 1614.
85 1& § 1722(a).
S6 Id. § 1723(e).
87Id § 1723(d).
8 &.§ 1711 (j)(2).
89Id. § 1711 (j) (3). The Securities Investor Protection Corporation is a non-
profit membership corporation established to protect investors in case of broker-
dealer insolvency. See id. § 1202.
90 It discards the notion of privity in transactions on national exchanges and
omits any reference to a requirement of contemporaneous trading. Id. § 1703(b).
9 l Limiting the Plaintiff Class, supra note 34, at 1416-17, 1428.
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Despite these achievements, the ALI Code falls short in several
respects. In striving to be fair to defendants, it assures that only
minimal deterrence will be achieved. Because the only sanction
insiders face is disgorgement of their ill-gotten gains, insiders are
not deterred from trading. If a transaction is not detected, the
insider makes a profit. If it is detected, the insider is forced only
to disgorge his or her profits and, therefore, is in no worse a posi-
tion than before the trading.92 Another serious drawback of the
upper limit on damages is illustrated by cases such as Elkind, in
which the total plaintiff "losses" far exceed the defendants' gains.9 3
Each plaintiff's prorated share is likely to be so small as to remove
all incentive to sue. Indeed, because attorneys' fees are not awarded
as a matter of course,9 4 the plaintiffs actually might lose money by
successfully pursuing a private 1Ob-5 action. Moreover, the ALI
Code provides that if proration seems not worth the effort, the
plaintiffs may be bypassed entirely.95 Such an outcome would re-
move the incentive to sue in many cases and thus would diminish
the deterrent effect.
The ALI Code also seems particularly inattentive to empirical
evidence suggesting enforcement difficulties. Indeed, this is among
the major criticisms leveled at the codification project as a whole.9 6
The ALI Code does little to reduce the complex problems of proof
or the expense involved in prosecuting a private action. It does
not respond adequately, therefore, to the difficult issues surround-
ing the 1Ob-5 private action.
III. PROPOSAL
In order to solve the existing problems of inefficiency and
complexity of proof, this Comment proposes two major modifica-
tions of the lOb-5 private action: a shift of the burden of proof to
the defendant upon a prima facie showing by the plaintiff, and the
use of a derivative suit-type action in which attorneys' fees are
awarded to successful plaintiffs as a matter of course. The ALI
Code is suggested as an appropriate vehicle for implementing these
proposals. The proposals abandon the concept of compensation
92 The insider whose violation is detected might simply surrender whatever gain
he or she had made without a battle to show a good faith desire to make amends
and to avoid attorneys' fees that would be incurred in defending an action.
93 See supra note 45.
4 ALI CODE, supra note 5, § 1723(d).
95 Id. §1711(i).
"See Sowards, Foreword, 33 U. Mr. Mu L. REgv. 1426 (1979).
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-to a plaintiff class and thus avoid the assessment of "Draconian"
,damages while maximizing the private action's deterrent effect.
A. Shifting the Burden of Proof
1. The Lesson and Policy of Section 16(b)
The Comment's proposal draws heavily on the structure and
.underlying policies of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act.9 That section
requires a plaintiff to show merely that a particular defendant is
within the class of people to whom the section applies, that the
insider purchased and sold or sold and purchased the corporation's
.equity securities within six months, and that the insider profited.98
An irrebuttable presumption of trading on the basis of inside
information then attaches,99 and a defendant must disgorge any
profits to the issuer of the security. In contrast to the subjective
elements of a lOb-5 action, the plaintiff's burden in section 16(b)
cases includes only objective elements.10° The ease with which
they may be established allows section 16(b) to operate as a "crude
rule of thumb." 101
97For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any pur-
chase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than
six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding
six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the
owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer
if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after
request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no
such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit
was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any trans-
action where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or
any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regu-
lations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this
subsection.
15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1976).
9 8 See Comment, Insider Trading-Narrowing the Scope of Section 16(b):
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 1976 UTAIY L. PrEv. 400, 402
[hereinafter cited as Narrowing the Scope]; Note, Exceptions to Liability under
Section 16(b): A Systematic Approach, 87 YAL. L.J. 1430, 1431 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Exceptions to Liability].
99 Narrowing the Scope, supra note 98,at 402-03.
100 See id. 403 n.28.
101 Id.
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Section 16(b)'s specific intent is to curb corporate insiders' use-
of their informational advantages to make fast profits through short
swing speculation. 102 Congress, therefore, has expressed a clear
desire to end certain insider trading practices: those that fall on
the wrong side of the section 16(b) "bright line." 103 Logically,
however, very little distinguishes many situations to which section
16(b) would apply from other situations to which it would not.
Consider, for example, an insider who after buying securities waits
seven months, or for that matter seven years, before selling. If he
or she relied on material, nonpublic information in making the
purchase, any profits made during the time when the information
remained nonpublic arguably are objectionable under the logic, if
not the language, of section 16(b). Similarly, the insider's first
cousin or the company's investment banker who, by virtue of his
or her relationship with the insider, is able to make short swing
profits has violated the spirit of section 16(b).
A plaintiff faced with many of the possible variations of insider
trading, therefore, frequently would be unable to rely on section
16(b) because of its narrow scope. Such a plaintiff must turn to
section 10(b) for relief.1°4 Under that section, he or she would
have to establish standing, materiality, use of information, and
scienter. °5 These requirements prove prohibitive in many cases.
Yet the differences in the defendants' actions do not seem sufficiently
great to justify such a massive increase in the plaintiff's burden of
proof. Moreover, the differences between the two methods of
establishing liability illustrate the potential for a large gap in the
enforcement framework.
2. Shifting the Burden of Proof
This Comment proposes a mechanism modeled on section 16(b)
as a means of remedying the ineffectiveness of 1Ob-5 private actions.
102 Narrowing the Scope, supra note 98, at 401; Exceptions to Liability, supra
note 98, at 1430-32.
0 3 As the preceding discussion indicates, § 16(b) appears to impose liability
on a clearly defined category of people. Courts, however, have fashioned ex-
emptions from liability in some situations, thereby blurring the bright line. Excep-
tions to Liability, supra note 98, at 1432-34. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v.
Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976) (§ 16(b) does not apply to a
purchase and sale if the beneficial owner did not have a 10% holding prior to
purchase).
'o4 Foremost-McKesson, 423 U.S. at 255 (omission from section 16(b)'s cover-
age still leaves recourse, in particular, to rule 10b-5). See the discussion of this case
in Narrowing the Scope, supra note 98, at 410-11.
105 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Although the plaintiff class is defined as in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,1°1 compensation is abandoned as a goal. In-
,stead, any proceeds resulting from the suit flow to the corporation
.whose securities were traded. The private action, therefore, takes
,the form of a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation as the
true party in interest. The derivative suit has been used success-
fully to attack insider trading on the state level 107 and with several
modifications could become a powerful federal remedy. Recovery
would go to the corporation to compensate. it for any injury to its
reputation and for the unauthorized use of its information.103 This
would result in an indirect benefit to all shareholders of the
issuer 109 and would also serve to promote integrity and public con-
fidence in the securities markets.
To address the complexities of proof facing the private claim-
ant, this Comment proposes shifting the plaintiff's burden of proof
upon a prima facie showing of several elements: that the defendant
is an officer or director of the issuer, or another person who by
virtue of his or her relationship to the corporation could have
access to material, nonpublic information; 11 that the purchase or
sale resulted in a profit, and that the profit was made at a time
when, depending on the nature of the information, it could reason-
ably be expected to be available to insiders."n
106 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text
'0 7 Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 424, 248 NXE.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1969).
'
0 8 See supra note 65.
109A damage recovery will result in a balance sheet increase in the share-
holders' equity holdings in the corporation.
110 See ALI CODE, supra note 5, § 1603(b).
In cases involving tippees, the key element to be established is the existence of
a relationship between the tippee and the corporation whose securities were traded.
The usual classes of potential tippees include market-makers, investment bankers, and
financial analysts. For example, a company insider may perceive several gains for
his company in leaking information to an investment banking firm that has previously
underwritten the company's securities. Similarly, an insider may disclose information
to a market-maker or specialist in the company's securities who can enhance their
marketability.
A financial analyst has the most tenuous relationship with a corporation; the
analyst performs a monitoring and investment analysis function. When the de-
fendant is a financial analyst, therefore, a plaintiff may be unable to establish this
element and shift the burden of bringing evidence forward. Some analyst de-
fendants thus may escape prosecution; this would seem appropriate, however,
because the analyst is less likely to have received inside information. A corporate
insider has little to gain from tipping a financial analyst having little direct contact
with the company. See infra note 133.
111This provision is meant to focus a court's attention, if necessary, on a
l6nger period of time than that relevant to § 16(b) actions. The proposal reaches
situations in which the nature of the information makes it likely to be available to
insiders long before public disclosure. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 97& (1969).
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This showing would create a rebuttable presumption of ob-
jectionable insider trading. The shifted burden of proof rests more
comfortably on the defendants, who are most likely to have access
to the relevant information. To rebut the presumption, the de-
fendants would have to show that they had no access to the non-
public information, that they did not rely on it, or that the infor-
mation was not material. Factors relevant to that inquiry include.
the extent of the insider's original holdings and the percentage in-
crease or decrease in those holdings; reasons to buy or sell that are
available to the public and the extent to which a trade was made
consistently with such public information, and other factors that
might influence a decision to buy or sell, such as an immediate
need for funds, sales according to an established long-term invest-
ment plan, or participation in a company stock option plan.112 The
large number of arguments available to defendants make it clear
that they are by no means strictly liable. The burden is on them,
however, to bring out the relevant information, which is likely to
be primarily at their disposal.
The immediate problem presented by these suggestions is that
there no longer exists any substantial incentive to sue. A share-
holder hardly can be expected to spend the money necessary to
pursue a derivative action of this sort if the only reward he or she
can expect is the indirect benefit derived from the increased wel-
fare of the corporation"13 or of the investing community as a
whole. 14 Again, the example of section 16(b) presents a solution.
Under section 16(b) it has been recognized that "in many cases
. . . the possibility of recovering attorney's fees will provide the
sole stimulus for . . . enforcement .... ,, "1 This proposal
relies on the same stimulus.
B. Awarding Attorneys' Fees as a Matter of Course
As in section 16(b) cases, the plaintiff's pecuniary interest in
the lOb-5 action proposed in this Comment is nominal because the
112A number of additional considerations may apply only to certain defendants.
For example, if the defendant is an investment bank with a relationship to the
corporation, a relevant factor might be the degree to which nonpublic information
that is available to certain employees of the bank is prevented from leaking into,
its other departments. See generally Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Com-
ment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REv.
677, 708-11 (1980).
"'s See supra note 109.
114 See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
115 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 751 (1943). Moreover, as in § 16(b) cases, "the allowance must not be
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defendants' disgorged profits flow to the corporation. Attorneys,
,on the other hand, can be motivated to pursue lOb-5 claims by the
fees they will collect in a successful case. Unlike a section 16(b)
case, however, the fees will be paid by the defendant, not by the
,corporate beneficiary of the suit.
Under the American rule regarding attorneys' fees, each party
generally must bear his or her own attorneys' fees.":, Exceptions
to this rule have been made when a plaintiff's suit creates a common
benefit or when a party litigates in bad faith."17 Because this
-Comment's proposal combines the rationales underlying both ex-
ceptions to the American rule, it presents a strong case for awarding
attorneys' fees.
1. The Common Benefit Exception
When a single litigant confers a benefit on a class of potential
plaintiffs, the individual plaintiff's attorneys' fees may be paid out
of the common fund or recovery. 18 In section 16(b) cases, for
example, the corporation recovers the insiders' profits and out of
those profits pays the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.1 9 In the proposed
lOb-5 derivative suit, a plaintiff is acting in the interests of other
shareholders, 20 who also will benefit from the plaintiff's victory.
The rationale underlying the common benefit exception, therefore,
would justify a fee award to such a plaintiff.
too niggardly," id., and must flow even in cases that are settled out of court.
Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 326 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1964).
" 6 See generally Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees in Recognition of
Student Lawyering, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 161, 166 (1981).
117See generally, Note, Recovery of Attorneys' Fees under Rule 1Ob-5, 53
No=s DANm LAw. 320, 321 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Attorneys' Fees].
381Id. 326. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (sub-
stantial benefit justified the award of attorneys' fees where the benefit-"fair and
informed corporate suffrage"---extended to all shareholders).
119 Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 241.
120 Arguably, the plaintiff in such a suit also is protecting the interests of the
entire investing community, because of the suit's deterrent effect, and thus might
be considered a "private attorney general." See generally Attorneys' Fees, supra
note 117, at 327-29. Under this notion, individuals who act to vindicate the public
good are reimbursed for the costs of their efforts. Id. 328. The Supreme Court in
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), indicated
its uneasiness with this concept in cases arising under the civil rights statutes. Id.
269. Congress, however, responded swiftly with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-599, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1976)), which effectively reversed Alyeska. Congress reasoned that if the
costs of private enforcement were too great, there would be no private enforcement.
Attorneys Fees, supra note 117, at 343 n.195. Similarly, in the proposed 10b-5
suit, because the plaintiff recovers no direct damages, the cost of enforcement
ordinarily would be prohibitive. Id. 343.
19811
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2. The Bad Faith Exception
Applying the reasoning underlying the common benefit ex-
ception, this Comment contends that a plaintiff in a successful 1Ob-5
derivative suit should not bear the burden of attorneys' fees. The
Comment goes further, however, to propose that the defendant
should pay those fees.
The possibility that defendants could be held liable for plain-
tiffs' attorneys' fees is not without support in the law of equity. An
exception to the American rule has been recognized when one party
litigates in bad faith.121 This exception is incorporated in the ALI
Code. 122 In enacting section 16(b), Congress recognized that certain
circumstances gave rise to so strong a presumption of objectionable
insider trading that a strict liability standard was justified.123  This
Comment urges that Congress recognize the likelihood of the same
type of trading violation in an extended set of circumstances. These
circumstances-the insider's violation of section 10(b)-warrant equal
treatment. Accidental misuse of material, nonpublic information
is unlikely. Insiders who defend against charges that have merit
may be hoping that the complexity and costs involved in a lOb-5
private action will discourage plaintiffs. Such tactics should be
sufficient to support a finding of bad faith and an award of attor-
neys' fees. 24 Although attorneys' fees may be assessed against some
violators not using such tactics,125 the interest in deterring viola-
tions outweighs this concern.
3. Deterrence
This Comment has proposed eliminating compensation for
plaintiffs,, replacing it with a requirement that defendants disgorge
their ill-gotten profits. Without an additional deterrent, however,
a defendant has little to lose through insider trading. If a viola-
121 See generally Attorneys' Fees, supra note 117, at 324-25.
122 ALI CoDE, supra note 5, § 1723(d).
123 See Narrowing the Scope, supra note 98, at 402-03.
124 Under the bad faith doctrine as it is currently understood, the insider's
conduct would not be considered sufficiently wanton to support an award of
attorneys' fees. This Comment, however, contends that the rationale underlying
the bad faith exception does apply to this situation; thus, explicit legislative reform
is warranted.
The extent to which prelitigation conduct by a defendant can constitute bad
faith is not clear. Compare Universal Oil Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580
(1946), with Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). See generally Comment, supra
note 116, at 167 n.39 (discussing bad faith conduct during discovery and FED. R.
Crv. P. 37).
125 Note that this would affect only those defendants who lose after litigating
in good faith-a number that probably is small.
[Vol. 130:460
THE lob-5 PRIVATE ACTION
tion is detected, the insider-defendant simply can -surrender his or
her profits; if it is not detected, the insider profits illegally. The
,only possible harm to defendants would result from negative pub-
licity concerning the surrender of illegal profits. The potential
profits, however, may make the gamble worthwhile. Without an
additional, more substantial deterrent, therefore, this Comment's
proposal will prove ineffective.
If the defendant will be required to pay the plaintiff's attor-
neys' fees, however, he or she does stand to lose something by vio-
lating rule 10b-5.12 The effect is analogous. to assessing against
the defendant a multiple of his or her profits to achieve deterrence,
a method that has been proposed to deal with section 10(b)'s lack
of deterrent impact.
127
C. The Role of the ALI Code
The ALI Code is suggested as a convenient vehicle for imple-
menting this Comment's proposal, because the Comment's goals
appear to be consistent with those of the framers of the ALI Code.
That compensation to plaintiffs theoretically injured by insider
trading is a minor concern of the ALI Code can be inferred from
its limits on damages and the availability of an alternative remedy
that completely bypasses the plaintiffs. 128 Comments to an earlier
draft of the ALI Code make this inference express. "The aim is
compensation if practicable but in any event deterrence and avoid-
ance of unjust enrichment." 129 To some extent the private remedy
may have been retained in this form for symbolic effect. The ALI
Code's Reporter, Louis Loss, acknowledges that this has been done
in other areas,130 and the 1Ob-5 private action may carry more sym-
bolic weight than sections that are less notorious. Nonetheless,
symbolism should not be allowed to outweigh one of the principal
1
2 The SEC has proposed amending the ALI Code to assess 150% of the de-
fendant's profits as damages against the defendant. See Statement Concerning
Codification of Federal Securities Laws, SEC Securities Act Release No. 6242 (Sept.
18, 1980), 20 SEC Docket 1483, 1499, 571 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-1,
F-2. Adoption of this proposal could provide additional deterrence. Cf. Kahan v.
Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970) (attorneys'
fees awards in lOb-5 actions provide supplemental enforcement for the SEC).
Other parties also occasionally provide enforcement support, see, e.g., Texasguif
Chairman Charles F. Fogarty, Four Other Officers Killed in Plane Crash, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 13, 1981, at 2, col 3.
127 See supra note 126.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 79-82 & 87-89.
129 ALI FED. SEc. CODE § 1409, Comment (5)(a) (Tent Draft No. 2, 1973).
180 Id. § 1413, Comment (2).
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goals of the ALI Code: "to promote efficiency in investor protec-
tion." 131 Refining the ALl Code to conform to this Comment's
proposal would be consistent with that goal.
32
D. Summary
This proposal will not cure all the ills that have plagued the
1Ob-5 private action. Some insider trading violations still will be
difficult to establish, such as those by financial analysts whose rela-
tionships to sources of inside information are likely to be clouded.' 33
Neither is there any assurance that innocent traders will never be
penalized.
Despite these problems, the proposal outlines a structure that
would improve the current system. The proposed private action
moves away from common law fraud in the face-to-face transaction
context and toward section 16(b) and the securities markets setting
as the source of the action's underlying principles. As in section
16(b), plaintiffs are not directly compensated. Rather, a share-
holder benefits because the shareholders' equity is improved by any
private action recovery and because investor confidence in the secu-
rities markets in general may be maintained or increased.
The burden on plaintiffs, in terms of both cost and complexity
of proof, is comparatively small. Violators whose conduct is not
covered by section 16(b) and who are shielded by the complexity
and cost of the present 1Ob-5 action will be prime targets for private
actions under the proposed system. This increase in the number
of potential defendants, coupled with defendants' liability for at-
torneys' fees, makes enhanced deterrence likely.
131 ALI CODE, supra note 5, Introduction, at xv.
'3
2 That this proposal would involve major modifications of the ALI's proposed
scheme is no reason to hesitate. Recent speculation suggests that the ALI Code
faces serious obstacles in Congress. See ALL Code Faces Pivotal Year, Chances
of Passage Diminished by Large Turnover, 586 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-I
(Jan. 14, 1981). Time is available, therefore, to revise the Code. Moreover,
reformulation of the lOb-5 private action might make enactment of the Code, or
at least this segment, more likely. In the meantime, such a revision could provide
courts with a basis on which to reevaluate their treatment of insider trading cases.
'33 Proving a case against a financial analyst is likely to remain difficult under
the proposed scheme. Analysts ordinarily do not have the kind of ongoing relation-
ship with corporate insiders that investment bankers or market-makers, for example,
might have. The corporation does not have incentive to leak information to
analysts because no benefit is derived in return. See supra note 110. The plaintiff,
therefore, probably would not be able to shift the burden of proof, because the
existence-of-a-relationship element would be missing. The plaintiff then would
have to shoulder the heavy burden of proving a 10b-5 violation as it is presently
formulated.
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Enforcement resources are likely to be expended with greater
per-dollar efficiency under the proposed structure. Attorneys de-
pendent for-their fees on the successful litigation of these actions
will be selective in the violations they choose to pursue. This
consideration will help to eliminate the possibility of spurious
suits.134 Generally, providing a private action with bite will aid
the SEC in the task of securities regulation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The private 1Ob-5 action has proven itself an ineffective en-
forcement tool for insider trading violations. A legislative recon-
sideration of the area is necessary; the ALI Code provides a con-
venient structure within which to implement a new form for the
private action. If such a plan can reduce insider trading and in-
crease public confidence in the securities markets, it will remove
influences that interfere with the "functioning of the exchanges,
upon which the economic well-being of the whole country de-
pends." 135 It will increase the "room for legitimate speculation in
the balancing of investment demand and supply, in the shrewd
prognostication of future trends and economic directions." 136 Secu-
rities markets should operate in this manner, and Congress should
make an effort to see that they do.
'14 A further safeguard would be provided by allowing the courts, in cases in
which the plaintiff's claim is in bad faith, to award attorneys' fees to the defendant.
See ALI CODE, supra note 5, § 1723(d).
135 H.R. RFP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEcis-
LATrvE HIsToRY, supra note 26, Item 18.
18 Id.
